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Workshop overview
The Individualisation of War Project at the European University 
Institute recently hosted a workshop on humanitarian actors’ engagement 
with accountability mechanisms in situations of armed conflict.  The 
workshop brought together practitioners – staff from international 
tribunals, fact-finding bodies, UN Sanctions Committee Panels of 
Experts, the UN, and humanitarian organisations.
The Individualisation of War Project explores the tensions arising from 
the increased prominence of the individual in the theory and practice of 
armed conflict133. One manifestation of this process of individualisation are 
the endeavours to enhance accountability for violations of international 
humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL). These 
include the establishment of international and national tribunals and non-
-judicial mechanisms such as commissions of inquiry, and the imposition 
of targeted sanctions. These are important measures for promoting 
compliance with the law and, consequently, enhancing the protection of 
civilians, but their implementation can give rise to tensions with 
humanitarian actors’ activities to provide protection and assistance, often to 
the same civilians. Humanitarians frequently have valuable first -hand 
information on violations or are in direct contact with affected communities. 
However, the risk exists that if they share this information with accountability 
mechanisms – or are suspected of doing so – this may undermine their 
operations (and those of others) and put their staff and beneficiaries at risk. 
This is not a new tension, but it has become more prominent following the 
establishment of a number of international criminal tribunals in the 1990s. 
133 For more on the background, scope and streams of Individualisation of War Project, see http://iow.eui.eu. 
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Its extent has increased further as the Security Council has imposed 
sanctions against groups and persons considered to have committed 
violations of IHL with increasing frequency.134
Humanitarian actors have reacted to this tension in a variety of ways. At 
one end of the spectrum is the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) which ordinarily will not cooperate with national or international 
tribunals. The majority of its headquarters agreements grant its staff 
immunity from being called to testify before national courts135; and the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
expressly note that information, documents or other evidence generated by 
the ICRC is not subject to disclosure, including by way of testimony.136
United Nations (UN) agencies, funds and programmes are in a 
different position, at least when it comes to the ICC. In the 2004 
Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the International Criminal 
Court and the UN the UN has undertaken to cooperate with the ICC. 
This cooperation has included the provision of assistance to the Court’s 
organs – the Prosecutor, but increasingly also the Defence – by making 
available documents and information generated or obtained by the UN 137. 
UN staff have also been made available for interviews, and some have 
testified before the Court. In an effort to balance the desire – and 
134 The Consolidated United Nations Security Council Sanctions List includes numerous individuals and 
entities or other groups on account of violations of IHL. On this matter see for example the sanctions 
designation criteria concerning Mali, South Sudan and Yemen in S.C. Resolution 2374, U.N. Doc. S/
RES/2374 (5 September, 2017); S.C. Resolution 2206, U.N. Doc S/RES/2206 (3 March, 2015); S.C. 
Resolution 2140, U.N. Doc S/RES/2140 (26 February 2014).
135 The ICRC has concluded bilateral status agreements with the majority of countries in which it is opera-
tional today, whereas in other places it is granted the same privileges and immunities on the basis of do-
mestic legislation. The agreements are largely confidential but they are known to mirror, to a large extent, 
the provisions of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the Convention on the Privileges 
and Immunities of the United Nations. Some publicly available examples include the Agreement between 
the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Swiss Federal Council to determine the legal status 
of the Committee in Switzerland (1993), Part II; Australia’s International Organisations (Privileges and 
Immunities) Act of 1963, as amended by the International Organisations (Privileges and Immunities) 
(International Committee of the Red Cross) Regulation 2013, Australia’s Select Legislative Instrument 
No. 237, 2013, (08 November, 2013); US International Organizations Immunities Act of 1945, as amen-
ded by Executive Order 12643 (June 23, 1988) and France’s Loi n° 2003-475 du 4 Juin 2003 relative aux 
privilèges et immunités de la délégation du Comité International de la Croix-Rouge en France. On this 
issue see Debuf, Els (2016), ’Tools to do the job: The ICRC’s legal status, privileges and immunities’, 
International Review of the Red Cross, Volume 97, n.º 897-898, pp. 319-344, available at: https://www.
icrc.org/en/international-review/article/tools-do-job-icrcs-legal-status-privileges-and-immunities [accessed 
27 Sep. 17].
136 See Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICC, Rule 73, paragraph 4.
137 Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the ICC and the UN, Article 5 on Exchange of Information 
and Article 18 on Cooperation between the UN and the Prosecutor, paragraph 3.
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obligation – to cooperate with the ICC with the possible adverse 
consequences of doing so, much of this information was, in the past, 
provided on condition of confidentiality and solely for the purpose of 
generating new evidence, in the understanding that it would not be 
disclosed to other organs of the Court or to third parties, without the 
UN’s consent.
Accountability mechanisms also have tensions to address. In the case 
of the ICC the need to balance the protection of witnesses and other 
sources of information with the needs of a fair trial that respects the rights 
of the accused and the needs of victims came to the fore in two recent 
cases, where documents provided to the Prosecutor by the UN on this 
basis were considered to contain information that was potentially 
exculpatory or material to the preparation of the defence. As a result, it is 
not clear whether and, if so, to what extent UN agencies may continue to 
cooperate with the ICC in this manner.
Session 1 – What Are Accountability Mechanisms looking for?
The first session focused on the position of accountability mechanisms, 
looking at the type of information that humanitarian actors may have that 
accountability mechanisms are interested in; and the measures they have 
taken to date to allay humanitarian actors’ concerns about providing 
information.
Discussions started with three brief presentations addressing the 
question from the point of view of the ICC, UN sanctions panels of 
experts and commissions of inquiry.
A. International Criminal Courts
1. Type of information sought
Humanitarian actors are often the first responders on the ground, and 
investigators and prosecutors realise that they may have information that 
is extremely valuable to their work. It is not just information on suspected 
violations and their perpetrators that is of interest to criminal tribunals, 
but also background information that may be relevant in determining 
whether an armed conflict existed in a particular context at specific 
moment in time. Investigators might also be interested in speaking to the 
authors of reports in the public domain to identify the sources of 
information on which they relied and other useful people to contact at the 
local level.
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Cooperation should not be considered as a one -way street; the ICC has 
been approached by humanitarian actors seeking guidance on the 
contextual elements necessary to prove a particular element of a crime 
and the type of information they should gather for proceedings relating to 
attacks against their staff.
2. Measures taken to allay concerns
Asking the staff of humanitarian organisations for information may 
put their operations and safety at risk, accordingly, the ICC has developed 
working methods that attempt to reconcile the desire to obtain information 
and evidence while it is still as fresh as possible in people’s minds with 
these risks. Requests are made to humanitarian actors as a measure of last 
resort, if there is no one else likely to have the same information. In order 
to ensure consistency of approach and add a layer of protection, requests 
for information are addressed to humanitarian organisations’ headquarters, 
rather than to the relevant field missions or to staff members. The 
information requested and the reasons why it is sought are explained 
clearly.
It is also essential that there be clarity as to the conditions under which 
information is provided, and, in particular, whether this can be done under 
strict confidentiality. This is important for humanitarian actors but also 
for others that have been asked to share relevant information, such as 
national intelligence services or multi -national forces such as NATO. In 
the past, in engaging with UN agencies, funds and programmes the ICC 
Prosecutor had relied extensively on the possibility foreseen under Article 
54(3) ICC Statute and replicated in the 2004 ICC UN Agreement, to 
collect information on condition of confidentiality and solely for the 
purpose of generating new evidence. In the Lubanga and Katanga and 
Chui cases138, however, the Prosecutor found that materials obtained on 
this basis contained information that was potentially exculpatory or 
material to the preparation of the defence. As the UN would not lift the 
conditions of confidentiality under which the information had been 
provided, so that it could be transmitted to the Defence, nor agreed to 
disclose the information to the Chambers to that the potential impact of 
138 ICC, Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute) ICC-01/04-
01/06, Trial Chamber I (14 March, 2012); ICC, Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo 
Chui (Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Germain Katanga against the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber II of 
12 June 2009 on the Admissibility of the Case) ICC-01/04-01/07 OA 8, Appeals Chamber (25 September, 
2009).
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their non -disclosure could be evaluated, the Trial Chamber stayed the 
proceedings139. In reaching this decision, the Trial Chamber appears to 
have placed particular weight on the fact that the Prosecution had relied 
on Article 54 (3) ICC Statute arrangements on a routine basis rather than 
exceptionally, and also apparently in order to obtain evidence that could 
potentially be used at trial, instead of using the material solely to generate 
new evidence, as envisaged by the provision140. While the difficulties 
were eventually resolved in these two cases, since then the Prosecutor 
avoids relying on this arrangement. Instead, providers of information are 
asked from the outset to provide information in a manner, possibly 
redacted, that can be shared with the Defence.
While the ICC does have a witness protection programme that could, 
in theory, be of relevance to staff members of humanitarian organisations 
who provide information141, in practice it is very difficult to get into the 
programme. Frustration has been expressed about the lack of clarity, if 
not conflicting information received from different parts of the ICC on 
key modalities of the programme, including on what amounts to “entering 
into contact” with the ICC, the consequences thereof, and on the division 
of labour within the ICC in relation to the programme. Moreover, while 
the witness protection programme may be of assistance to individuals 
who provide information it is unlikely to provide much protection to 
humanitarian organisations.
Acknowledging the importance of developing a relationship of mutual 
trust and respect, the ICC has strived to establish open channels of 
communications that allow “both sides” to explain their needs and concerns.
Looking beyond the ICC to criminal investigations more generally, it 
is essential that they be carried out in a well -planned and focused manner. 
This is beneficial for all involved. Identifying the specific information 
and documents that an accountability mechanism would like to obtain 
from a particular humanitarian actor can reduce the risks for the latter and 
also build confidence in the relationship. From the perspective of the 
investigating body, not only can an unfocused “fishing exercise” where 
all available information is collected lead to a significant amount 
139 See Tamara Cummings -John, “Cooperation between the United Nations and the International Criminal 
Court”, International Organizations Law Review, Vol 10(1), 2013, 223. 
140 See, for example, Rod Rastan, “Review of ICC Jurisprudence 2008”, Northwestern Journal of Interna-
tional Human Rights Law, Vol 7, Number 2 (Summer 2009), 261, 270 -276. 
141 See ICC Statute, Article 68 on Protection of the victims and witnesses and their participation in the pro-
ceedings and Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICC, Rules 87 and 88 on protective measures.
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unnecessary work, but it may also preclude it from relying upon valuable 
information because it was obtained improperly or because its chain of 
custody did not meet minimum due process standards.
B. Sanctions Panels of Experts
1. Awareness of concerns and measures taken to allay them
Humanitarian actors’ engagement with UN sanctions panels of experts 
gives rise to additional issues, starting from the mutual lack of awareness 
of each other’s mandates. Apart from the humanitarian expert, members 
of sanctions panels are unlikely to have had any previous engagement 
with humanitarian actors or awareness of their potential reservations 
about sharing information. On their side, most humanitarian actors also 
have extremely limited familiarity with sanctions panels and their 
mandate. The distrust is exacerbated by the reservations that certain 
humanitarian actors may have about sanctions more generally, which 
some view as politicising aid and further weakening fragile states.
A first step in enhancing the understanding by panels of experts of the 
issues and sensitivities would be for the UN Department of Political 
Affairs, on which they depend, to provide an introduction to this topic, 
together with a country -specific briefing upon their appointment to the 
panel. Equally important would be the sharing of experiences among 
current and past panels of experts. Following the positive example set by 
the ICC, panels of experts should systematically reach out to the 
headquarters of the humanitarian organisations operating in the country 
for which they have responsibility, explaining their mandate, operating 
modalities and objectives. This would also be an opportunity for 
humanitarians to highlight their concerns.
While in theory the experts should be able to gather information 
themselves, in some contexts they have extremely limited mobility and 
must comply with UN security rules, including those requiring them to 
wear blue helmets and body armour and travel with escorts. This makes 
it difficult for them to travel or engage with people in a discreet way or, 
indeed, to access areas deemed unsafe, thus increasing their reliance on 
information held by humanitarian actors.
On their side, however, humanitarian actors have the same reservations 
about engaging with panels of experts as with other accountability 
mechanisms. The fact panels of experts are, formally speaking, a UN body, 
does not automatically lead members of the UN country team to share 
information. This is the case even if the panels of experts have been tasked 
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to monitor violations committed against the same categories of people, for 
example, children, whom specific organisations are mandated to protect.
In fact, the risks associated with providing information can be even 
more marked for panels of experts than for criminal tribunals. In 
international criminal prosecutions, the aim is to transfer suspects from 
the state where the alleged crimes were committed and where 
humanitarians operate. However, persons listed in sanctions regimes are 
not removed from their environment. A listed person can remain in-
-country, aware of the fact that humanitarian actors operating in that same 
country may have provided information that led to the listing.
The risks are exacerbated by the fact panels of experts are not in a 
position to offer assurances to humanitarian actors as to how any 
information they provide will be used. There is no formal arrangement, 
like that in the ICC Statute, for sharing information in confidence. At best 
individual panel members can give their own personal assurances that the 
identity of sources will be protected and information will be treated 
confidentially. No witness protection arrangements exist.
All of this said, the reality is that in certain contexts panels of experts 
are the only accountability mechanism that exists and, despite the potential 
risks, humanitarian actors do provide them information, with the ultimate 
aim of putting an end to violations of IHL and IHRL.
2. Type of information sought
Sanctions panels of experts look to humanitarian actors for a wide 
range of information relating to violations of IHL and IHRL that they 
have been tasked to monitor, as well as to the identity of groups and 
individuals suspected of being responsible therefor. They are also likely 
to be interested in the adverse humanitarian impact of the sanctions – an 
aspect of their work which might of itself be less likely to expose 
humanitarian actors to risk but which cannot be separated from the other 
parts of their mandate.
While panels of experts also frequently need assistance to ascertain 
the biometrics (names and aliases, date of birth, nationality, passport 
number etc) of listed persons, they have not asked humanitarian actors for 
this type of information, because of the clear risks this could pose.
As is the case for criminal tribunals, sharing of information can be a 
two -way street. There have been instances when humanitarian actors 
have asked panels of experts for information that the latter have obtained 
(eg information relating to children in custody that only the panels of 
experts have access to) but were refused it, for the protection of the 
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children. If specific individuals or groups are listed on the basis of the 
information the children provided to the panel of experts and the names 
of the children became known to the perpetrators, it could put the children 
and their families at risk.
Session 2 – The Position of Humanitarian Actors
The second session focused on the position of humanitarian actors, 
looking at the reasons underlying their reservations about providing 
information to accountability mechanisms, and the range of approaches 
for reducing adverse consequences that they have adopted.
Discussions started with three brief presentations addressing the 
question from the point of view of the ICRC, the UN, and Save the 
Children (UK).
A. Reasons underlying the reservations
At the basis of humanitarian actors’ reservations about cooperating 
with accountability mechanisms are concerns that if they provide 
information – or are suspected of doing so – parties the conflict whose 
behaviour is under scrutiny with control of the territory where they 
operate may impede their activities or put the security of their staff or 
beneficiaries at risk.
While all operational actors share this starting point, the extent of 
their concerns and, consequently, of their interaction with accountability 
mechanisms extent varies. At one end of the spectrum, the ICRC takes 
the position that any provision of information to any accountability 
mechanism may jeopardise its acceptance by parties to a conflict. This 
is regardless of the nature of the accountability mechanism – national or 
international; criminal, civil or other – or of whether it is perceived as 
politicised or not. As the ICRC’s operations are based on acceptance by 
all parties to a conflict, and the understanding that it will operate in a 
confidential manner, it takes the position that any provision of 
information may risk undermining its acceptance – in a particular 
context and more broadly.142
142 ICRC Memorandum on the ICRC’s Privilege of Non -disclosure of Confidential Information, Interna-
tional Red Cross Review, Vol 97, Spring/Summer 2015, 433 https://www.icrc.org/en/international-
-review/article/memorandum -icrcs -privilege -non -disclosure -confidential -information. 
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Other humanitarian actors adopt a case -by -case approach, depending 
on the accountability mechanism. The prime concern is not the nature of 
a particular mechanism, but rather whether it is perceived as politicised 
or somehow tainted, be it because it is considered as favouring a particular 
side to a conflict, or because its operating modalities to not meet minimum 
due process standards, in which case cooperating with it could undermine 
their neutrality or impartiality or the perceptions thereof.
While humanitarian actors’ concerns are clear and understandable, it is 
less clear whether those who are in a position to impede operations are 
actually aware of the different positions adopted by humanitarian actors, 
or simply consider them all “foreigners working with the ICC”. In certain 
contexts perceptions of humanitarian actors’ impartiality, neutrality and 
independence are already tainted to such a degree that it is questionable 
whether cooperating with accountability mechanisms can in fact 
undermine them further.
Traditionally, human rights organisations have been considered less 
susceptible to the possible adverse consequences of providing information 
to accountability mechanisms as they tended not to have field presences 
and therefore were not exposed to the same risks of having their operations 
jeopardised or security threatened. Their principal concern was whether 
they would be issued entry visas. More recently, however, some organisations 
have established field presences and face the same security risks as 
humanitarian actors. Some human rights organisations are also concerned 
that too close proximity with accountability mechanisms may preclude 
them from expressing concerns about the due process standards applied 
or other aspects of the mechanisms’ compliance with human rights.
In addition to these more operational concerns, a number of other 
considerations impact the nature and extent of humanitarian actors’ 
engagement with accountability mechanisms. Some considerations relate 
to particular humanitarian actors’ preferred approach to promoting 
compliance with IHL and IHRL. For example, when certain organisations 
have reliable information their preference will be, at least in the first 
instance, direct confidential dialogue with those responsible for the 
violations, rather than engaging with accountability mechanisms.
Other considerations relate to the fact that, for the most part, 
humanitarian actors are on the ground to implement programmes and not 
to gather information on possible violations of IHL and IHRL and on 
their perpetrators. This means, that even in those circumstances where 
they would want to cooperate, the information they have collected may 
not be admissible in criminal proceedings. In view of this, certain 
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humanitarian actors may feel that it is more effective to provide 
information to accountability mechanisms that have more flexible rules 
on admissible information than criminal tribunals, such as commissions 
of inquiry or fact -finding mechanisms.
Even human rights organisations, that tend to be on the ground to collect 
information on potential violations of IHL and IHRL, face this same 
problem. It is unlikely that their researchers have witnessed the perpetration 
of violations or have first -hand information that is admissible in criminal 
proceedings. At best, they could appear as “expert witnesses” on particular 
issues. In view of this, human rights organisations tend to engage at an 
earlier stage in criminal and other proceedings, when they can suggests 
issues that should be investigated, and possible sources to interview.
B. How have the concerns been addressed
Humanitarian actors have adopted a range of approaches to give effect 
to their positions on engagement with accountability mechanisms.
1. Red Cross Red Crescent Movement
In relation to the ICC, the ICRC has obtained an express recognition 
in Rules of Procedure and Evidence that information, documents or other 
evidence generated by the ICRC is not subject to disclosure, including by 
way of testimony.143 This position reflects decisions on this topic by the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)144. At national level, 
the majority of its headquarters agreements grant the ICRC and its staff 
immunity from all forms of legal process and inviolability to documents.145 
Efforts are currently afoot to ensure that states that receive ICRC 
documents also refrain from permitting their use in legal proceedings 
without the ICRC’s consent.
143 Article 73(6) ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence 2002. 
144 ICTY, Prosecutor v Simić (Decision on the Prosecution Motion Under Rule 73 for a Ruling Concerning 
the Testimony of a Witness) Case No. IT-95-9 (27 July 1999) paras 72-74; ICTY, Prosecutor v Brdjanin 
(Decision on Interlocutory Appeal) Case No. IT-99-36, Appeals Chamber (11 December 2002) para. 32; 
ICTR, Prosecutor v Muvunyi (Reasons for the Chamber’s Decision on the Accused’s Motion to Exclude 
Witness TQ) Case No. ICTR-2000-55 (15 July 2005) paras 14-16. On this issue see ICRC (2016). ‘Memo-
randum – The ICRC’s privilege of non-disclosure of confidential information’, International Review of 
the Red Cross, Volume 97, n.º 897-898, pp. 1-12, available at: https://www.icrc.org/en/international-review 
/article/memorandum-icrcs-privilege-non-disclosure-confidential-information [accessed 27 Sep. 17].
145 See above n 2 (need to change this in accordance with numbering in citation).
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All these arrangements foresee the possibility for the ICRC to waive 
its privilege in specific cases. Recently, the ICRC has done so in a national 
inquest relating to the abduction and murder of a staff member. 
Considerations that led to the waiver included the fact the proceedings 
related to a staff member to whom the organisation owed a duty of care, 
and that the majority of the relevant information was in the hands of the 
ICRC. Moreover it was possible to ensure that documents were shared 
with a limited number of people, and to make redactions. The ICRC 
intends to develop internal criteria to provide guidance on the 
circumstances in which it could consider waiving its privilege.
The disclosure of information is not the only possible way to proceed. 
For example, the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence also foresee 
consultations between the Prosecutor and the ICRC.146 If, in the course of 
this dialogue, the Prosecutor becomes convinced that the ICRC is in 
possession of exculpatory information, in all likelihood, rather than insist 
on its disclosure, the charges relating to that specific offence may be 
dropped.
National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies do not benefit from 
similar arrangements, even though their staff often works in situations of 
armed conflict, including alongside the ICRC, where similar considerations 
apply.
2. UN agencies, funds and programmes
The position of the UN is different. As noted earlier, UN agencies, 
funds and programmes are under an obligation to cooperate with the ICC 
and an important dimension of this cooperation is the provision of 
information. Over time the nature of this cooperation has become more 
sophisticated to take into account the needs and concerns of all sides 
more effectively.
All requests are channelled through the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) 
at Headquarters, which acts as a go between with the relevant UN 
substantive office. The Office of the Prosecutor is asked to be specific in 
its requests, and to explain the relevance of the requested materials to its 
investigations. On its side, the UN strives to reply to requests within thirty 
working days. The UN’s starting premise is that it will cooperate, but 
there are circumstances in which it will not do so or only provide a 
redacted version of a requested document. These include in response to 
146 Ibid. 
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requests for information whose disclosure would endanger the safety and 
security of persons, or prejudice the proper conduct of UN operations and 
activities, or information whose disclosure would violate confidentiality 
(ie information received by the UN from third parties, such as NGOs).147 
It is for the substantive office to which the request is addressed to 
determine whether these exceptions apply.
As discussed earlier, in the past extensive use had been made of the 
possibility of providing information on the basis of Article 54(3) ICC 
Statute, but since the Lubanga ruling it has not been resorted to148. Instead, 
if the UN accedes to a request to share information it now does so by 
preparing a document that may be placed in the public domain from the 
outset, if necessary by making redactions.
While it should not matter whether it is the Prosecution or the Defence 
that requests information, there is still a lingering discomfort in providing 
information to the Defence, as it is perceived as enhancing the risk that 
those associated with defendants may take measures against those 
providing the information. Of course this is not necessarily the case, and, 
in fact, the information provided by the UN could be of an exculpatory 
nature.
OLA is finalising a best practice manual to guide the organisation in 
deciding how to agree to requests from the ICC to provide information 
and, if so, on what basis149.
The position is simpler with regard to requests from accountability 
mechanisms that can be considered “UN bodies”, like sanctions panels of 
experts and certain tribunals or fact -finding bodies. Usually, there will be 
a UN resolution requiring cooperation, as well as an underlying obligation 
to share information and not obstruct the course of justice.
Within this overarching framework, different UN agencies, funds and 
programmes have developed their own approaches and internal guidance. 
For example, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA) will try to engage constructively with requests for information. 
In order to ensure consistency of approach and to avoid exposing staff in 
the field to pressure to cooperate all requests must go via OCHA 
147 See Tamara Cumming -John, supra. 
148 See above n 5 (need to change in accordance with numbering) and 135 (as numbered in the existing pdf 
file).
149 In september 2016 OLA issued the Best Practices Manual for United Nations – International Criminal 
Court Cooperation, available at: http://legal.un.org/ola/media/UN-ICC_Cooperation/Best%20Practice% 
20Guidance%20for%20UN-ICC%20cooperation%20-public.docx.pdf [accessed 27 Sep. 17].
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Headquarters. Cooperation may undermine OCHA’s ability to deliver 
against its core mandate if appropriate precautions are not taken. The 
accused may still be very powerful in their home countries with 
connections on the ground that may put the sources of information and 
their families at risk, affect the safety of staff, or undermine operations 
and access. Moreover, OCHA has a mandate to coordinate humanitarian 
actors, and some partners may not want to engage with it, should it 
provide information. As arrangements under Article 54(3) ICC Statute 
are no longer relied upon, information cannot be provided on a strictly 
confidential basis. This means that the staff member’s identity and the 
content of the interview will be disclosed to the Defence. This is an 
additional consideration to bear in mind when deciding to accede to 
requests for information. In many cases even if material is redacted or 
summarised, the mere fact of cooperating could be problematic. At times, 
concerns may end up being overwhelming and requests will be turned 
down.
3. NGOs
A number of NGO have also elaborated internal positions and policies 
to ensure consistency and provide guidance to their staff on how to 
respond to requests for information from accountability mechanisms. 
Accessible and reliable witness and victim protection programmes would 
allay some of their concerns about cooperating, even though these may 
reduce the risk faced by individuals but not by the organisations employing 
them. Greater clarity from accountability mechanisms as to the modalities 
for sharing of information and as to the rules governing the use of that 
information once it has been provided would also have an important 
confidence -building role.
The provision of information is not the only way in which humanitarian 
actors can assist accountability mechanisms. Other, potentially less 
problematic, ways of doing so could be by sharing their expertise in 
particular fields. For example, child -protection NGOs could share their 
experience on age verification and age -appropriate interviewing of 
witnesses and training of translators.
While the adoption of internal policies on engagement with 
accountability mechanisms by individual organisations is an essential 
first step, it is unlikely to be sufficient to reduce potential negative effects. 
A common position setting minimum standards to be followed by as 
many humanitarian actors operating in a particular context as possible, is 
likely to have a more significant impact.
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To date, this approach has only been adopted in one, particularly 
complex context: South Sudan, where there are a number of accountability 
mechanisms operating, with different mandates and all with limited 
access. This gives rise to an extremely challenging environment for 
humanitarian actors, compounded by mutual limited understanding of 
each other’s mandates, operating modalities, and affiliations. Severe 
constraints on access also mean that the monitoring mechanisms 
frequently turn to humanitarian actors for information. Moreover, security 
arrangements are such that some NGOs are based in the same “humanitarian 
hubs” on UN Mission premises as some monitors, giving rise to formal 
and informal proximity, and sharing of information, including 
unintentionally. This has led an important number of the NGOs operating 
in South Sudan to adopt a common position on engagement with the 
various accountability mechanisms. While there is no way of monitoring 
compliance with it, this is nonetheless an important step in raising 
awareness of the concerns and how to respond to them.
International NGOs’ increased reliance on national partners to 
implement their programmes raises an additional complexity. Possibly 
paradoxically, considering national staff face greater risks than 
international staff, in a number of contexts they indicated they want to be 
more outspoken and to engage with accountability mechanisms. Ways 
must be found of allowing this engagement in a manner that does not 
undermine the position adopted by the international partners. Doing so 
will be particularly challenging in contexts where parties to conflict are 
unlikely to distinguish between the various humanitarian actors.
Session 3 – The Criminal law Dimension
The third session focused on the criminal law dimension, looking at 
the tensions raised by criminal proceedings, most notably, the need to 
balance the protection of witnesses and other sources of information with 
the duty to carry out fair trials that respect the rights of the accused and 
the needs of victims.
The session started with three presentations highlighting certain 
challenges that may arise during the investigation phase and in the course 
of national and international criminal proceedings.
A. Suspected perpetrators of violations of IHl and IHRl
Prosecutors must ensure that all exculpatory material in their possession 
is turned over to the Defence. Complying with this basic element of a fair 
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trial may give rise to difficulties when exculpatory information is provided 
in confidence, including by humanitarian actors.
Prosecutors involved in international criminal proceedings have 
developed a range of possible ways of complying with this requirement 
in a manner that reduces the risks for the sources of information as far as 
possible. Sensitive material may be provided to the judges who determine 
whether it should be turned over to the Defence150. Documents could be 
provided to the Defence after changes have been made to protect sources. 
They could be summarised or redacted; or not handed over but instead 
read to Defence counsel in the Prosecutor’s office. Ultimately, if a 
Prosecutor has material that should be provided to the Defence, but is 
unable to find an acceptable way to share it, it might be necessary to drop 
the charge in question151. This might, on occasion, be a more effective 
way to maintain the credibility of the judicial system as well as the 
ongoing relationship between criminal tribunals and humanitarian actors.
While the Prosecution’s obligation is clear, the position of humanitarian 
actors is far less so. What responsibility – legal, moral, or ethical – if any, 
does a humanitarian organisation bear if material in its possession is 
exculpatory? Should it proactively provide it to the Defence? Or at least 
not turn down requests to do so?
Although sanctions regimes are frequently described as preventive 
rather than punitive in nature, listing clearly impairs a person’s rights in 
various ways. Moreover, the Security Council has consistently called 
upon national authorities to bring listed persons to justice including, in 
certain contexts, by calling upon states to exercise universal jurisdiction, 
while in others (the DRC and the Central African Republic), it has 
specifically mentioned the ICC 152. There is thus a disconnect between the 
public discourse about the nature of sanctions, and the clear limitations 
on human rights and the criminal law consequences of listing.
150 See Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICC, Rule 81 and Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the 
ICTY, Rule 66.
151 See for example ICC, Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Urgent Decision on the consequences of 
non-disclosure of exculpatory materials covered by Article 54(3)(e) agreements and the application to 
stay the prosecution of the accused, together with certain other issues raised at the Status Conference on 
10 June 2008) ICC-01704-01/06, Trial Chamber I (13 June, 2008) and on appeal ICC, Prosecutor v Tho-
mas Lubanga Dyilo (Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Trial Chamber I 
entitled “Decision on the consequences of non-disclosure of exculpatory materials covered by Article 
54(3)(e) agreements and the application to stay the prosecution of the accused, together with certain other 
issues raised at the Status Conference on 10 June 2008) ICC-01/04-01/06 OA 13, Appeals Chamber (21 
October, 2008).
152 See most recently S.C. Resolution 2360, U.N. Doc S/RES/2360 (21 June, 2017); S.C. Resolution 2339, 
U.N. Doc S/RES.2339 (27 January, 2017).
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B. Witnesses
While the ICTY and ICTR had the power to compel witnesses to 
appear153, there is a divergence of views as to the nature and extent of the 
ICC’s power in this regard. Crucial to this is the interplay of two provisions 
of the ICC Statute. Article 64(6)(b), that gives the Trial Chamber the 
authority to require the attendance and testimony of witnesses by obtaining, 
if necessary, the assistance of states parties; and Article 93 which requires 
states parties to facilitate the voluntary appearance of persons as witnesses 
or experts before the Court. Recent ICC jurisprudence would suggest that 
the Court can compel an appearance, but this is to be done via national 
courts154. Inasmuch as under this system national institutions also have a 
role in deciding whether to compel the staff of a humanitarian organization 
to testify, it is be important to familiarise them with humanitarian actors’ 
concerns and with possible ways of addressing them.
In the treatment of witness statements the ICC draws a clear distinction 
between disclosure to the accused and disclosure to the public155. To date 
it has not compelled the staff of international organizations to testify. If a 
UN staff member were to appear as a witness, the ICC would agree the 
modalities for this with the UN. The UN is likely to grant its consent to 
this under certain conditions, such as not revealing sources or demanding 
that the questioning by the Court not go beyond the scope of information 
that the UN staff member has already provided.
An alternative to the staff of humanitarian organisations appearing 
as witnesses is the possibility for them to provide information as “expert 
witnesses”. This allows them to bring important information before 
international tribunals on the context and trends. In a recent case before 
the ICC, two psychiatrists/psychologists testified, one extrapolated 
trends on sexual violence from available data, and the other gave an 
overview of how such abuses could affect victims and communities; 
something that could also be of relevant at the sentencing or reparations 
phases of the proceedings. While providing information in this manner 
153 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Article 19 paragraph 2; Statute 
of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, Article 18 paragraph 2; ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 
Rule 54; ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 54.
154 See The Prosecutor v William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang (Decision on Prosecutor’s Application 
for Witness Summonses and resulting Request for State Party Cooperation) ICC-01/09-01/11, Trial 
Chamber V (A) (17 April, 2014)
155 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICC, Rule 81 and cf. Rule 87 paragraph 3.
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could side step issues of admissibility, it is unlikely to address 
humanitarian actors’ concerns about being seen as cooperating with 
criminal tribunals.
C. Preservation of evidence
Information provided to accountability mechanisms must be gathered 
and preserved in a manner that meets the standards applied by such 
mechanisms and which, in the case of criminal courts, are understandably 
high. In the past failure to do so made it impossible for tribunals to rely 
on valuable information.
Efforts are being made to develop software including social media 
applications to overcome these problems. For example, the application 
EyeWitness to Atrocities, that anyone can download, can take photos, 
videos and recordings and stamp them with GPS coordinates, time and 
date indicating precisely when the material was recorded and whether it 
has been edited. The information can be transmitted anonymously from a 
secure internet connection to a secure database owned by the project 
where legal experts can then examine it and decide whether it is suitable 
for use in courts.156
While such approaches can resolve some of the problems related to 
preservation and authenticity of evidence, they may also give rise to 
suspicions that all carriers of mobile telephones will use them in this 
manner and make it even harder for parties to an armed conflict to agree 
to humanitarian actors’ use of telecommunications equipment.157
D. Victims
Humanitarian actors’ engagement with accountability mechanisms 
also needs to be considered from the perspective of victims of violations 
of IHL and IHRL. In addition to the reservations related to the potential 
adverse impact of cooperation on humanitarian actors, another concern is 
that in order to provide accurate information it may be necessary to return 
156 www.eyewitnessproject.org 
157 On the impact – positive and potentially adverse – of new technologies see Professional Standards for 
Protection Work Carried Out by Humanitarian and Human Rights Actors in Armed Conflict and Other 
Situations of Violence, (ICRC, 2013 edition), Chapter 6, “Managing sensitive protection information – 
Collecting information from afar: understanding the risks and advantages linked to new technologies and 
methodologies”, 81 -83. 
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to victims of violations to ask for additional information or for them to be 
interviewed – even repeatedly, as accountability mechanisms apply different 
standards of evidence – with the consequent risk of “re -victimisation”.
Also central is the question of victims’ consent to the transmission of 
the information they provide to humanitarian actors to accountability 
mechanisms. In view of the very clear risks such transmission may entail, 
humanitarian actors must be scrupulous in assuring themselves that the 
provision of consent is truly voluntary and informed. They must refrain 
from putting pressure on victims or beneficiaries of their programmes to 
agree to provide information.158
Conversely, victims and affected populations must not be prevented 
from providing information to accountability mechanisms should they 
wish to do so. To the extent they can, humanitarians should guide them to 
actors that can provide accurate advice on how to cooperate and the risks 
of doing so.
E. Professional privilege
Medical certificates issued by humanitarian actors that have provided 
medical treatment to victims of IHL and IHRL violations who want to 
rely on these certificates in accountability proceedings raise important 
issues. One relates to disclosure. Many national and international tribunals 
foresee the possibility of exempting communications made in the context 
of a professional relationship, most notably those with legal advisers or 
doctors from obligations of disclosure.159 There is no common position, 
however, as to which party has the power to waive this professional 
privilege – ie whether, in the case of a medical certificate it lies with the 
patient or with the care -provider.
From the perspective of humanitarian actors who have provided 
assistance and medical certificates, disclosure in proceedings of a 
certificate indicating violations of IHL and IHRL could have significant 
adverse consequences on their capacity to continue to carry out operations 
– both in the context with which the medical certificate is associated and 
beyond. From the point of view of victims, on the other hand, the 
certificate could have important evidentiary value.
158 On the question of the information providers’ consent see Professional Standards for Protection Work 
(supra), Chapter 6, “Managing sensitive protection information – Preparing interviews and ensuring 
 informed consent and privacy”, 92 -98. 
159 See, for example, Rule 73(2) and (3) ICC rules of Procedure and Evidence. 
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The starting point of a discussion of medical certificates should be that 
the primary objective of medical humanitarian organisations is to provide 
medical assistance to people in need. This treatment also includes the 
provision of a medical certificate but undue emphasis should not be 
placed on this. The certificates provided by humanitarian organisations 
are unlikely to have been issued by forensic doctors, and consequently, be 
admissible as such in criminal proceedings. This said, collectively and 
anonymously are of value in identifying trends. Medical humanitarian 
organisations have gone to great lengths to develop ways of encoding the 
names of patients and health providers to protect them should their 
facilities be raided.
Session 4 – How Can Tensions Be Reduced?
The final session focused on additional measures that could be taken 
by accountability mechanisms or by humanitarian organisations, either 
individually or collectively, to further reduce tensions.
In the two decades since the establishment of the ICTY and ICTR, 
humanitarian actors’ engagement with international criminal tribunals 
has become increasingly sophisticated and constructive. Both sides have 
familiarised themselves with each other’s needs and constraints and, [for 
the most part,] have found efficient ways to co -exist. Similarly, the 
tensions that existed between humanitarian actors adopting different 
approaches to engagement with criminal tribunals, and also between 
operational and human rights organisations have eased, as organisations 
have found the way to navigate their relationship with tribunals that most 
suits their identity. International criminal tribunals, and the ICC in 
particular, and humanitarians have progressively developed policies and 
working methods that enable them to engage in a manner that reduces 
adverse consequences for both sides.
Humanitarian actors’ engagement with other accountability mechanisms, 
and in particular with UN sanctions panels of experts, is not at the same 
stage of maturity and sophistication. The same process of gradual 
familiarisation needs to occur and consideration should be given to 
replicating some of the good practices developed by and in relation to 
international tribunals, adjusted as necessary.
A number of recommendations were made for further reducing the 
tensions:
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Recommendations addressed to international criminal tribunals:
• The confidence ‑building dialogue with humanitarian actors at 
headquarters level should continue, and be expanded to include 
other relevant humanitarian organisations. Efforts should continue 
to be made to address areas where further clarification is needed, 
such as for example, the functioning of the ICC witness protection 
programme.
• Good investigation practices developed by the ICTY, ICTR and ICC 
should be continued and disseminated to other bodies carrying out 
similar tasks. These include asking humanitarians for information 
as a last resort and in a focused manner, and explaining why 
particular information is needed, how it will be used and with whom 
it will be shared.
Recommendations addressed to UN sanctions panels of experts:
• The UN Department for Political Affairs should organise an 
induction for members of panels of experts on engaging with 
humanitarian actors, and facilitate the sharing of experience in this 
regard among current and past panels of experts.
• Panels of experts should systematically reach out to the headquarters 
of the humanitarian organisations operating in the country for which 
they have responsibility to explain their mandate, operating 
modalities and objectives, and hear humanitarians’ concerns.
• Panels of experts should develop common modalities on how to 
engage with humanitarian actors.
• Panels of experts should explore ways of providing binding 
assurances for humanitarian actors as to how information they share 
will be used and with whom it will be shared.
Recommendations relevant to all accountability mechanisms:
A significant body of good practices guiding accountability mechanisms’ 
engagement with humanitarian actors already exists. The challenge is 
putting them into practice: there are limited resources for disseminating 
them and ensuring they are applied. Compliance should be included in 
conditions of services and resources should be made available to facili-
tate their dissemination to all relevant accountability mechanisms.
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• The position of humanitarian actors before national accountability 
mechanisms should receive greater attention. Many of these 
mechanisms have the authority to compel the staff of humanitarian 
organisations to testify but are not necessarily aware of the concerns 
and risks. Efforts should be made to reach out to national bodies to 
bring to their attention humanitarian actors’ concerns and possible 
ways of reducing the risks.
Recommendations addressed to humanitarian actors:
• Humanitarian actors should determine with greater clarity the reasons 
underlying their reservations about cooperating with accountability 
mechanisms. Doing so will enable them to adopt a coherent and 
consistent position of whether, and if so how, to share information.
• Humanitarian actors should develop internal policies regulating 
their engagement with the entire range of accountability mechanisms; 
train their staff on them; and disseminate them to the accountability 
mechanisms. They should include issues such as which section the 
organisation is responsible for receiving, reviewing and responding 
to requests for information; modalities for providing information; 
and rules on how the organisation will engage with victims whose 
testimony may be sought.
• Humanitarian organisations that enjoy immunity from testimony 
should also develop guidance on the circumstances in which they 
would be willing to waive it. Consideration should be given to always 
waiving it in proceedings relating to attacks against their staff.
• Humanitarian actors operating in a particular context should 
consider developing a common position on engagement with 
relevant accountability mechanisms.
• Consideration should be given to including the question of 
engagement with accountability mechanism in professional 
standards for humanitarian actors and to developing Inter -Agency 
Standing Committee guidance on this topic.
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